The National and Regional Consequences of Australia’s Goods and Services Tax by Giesecke, James A & Tran, Nhi
The National and Regional Consequences of
Australia’s Goods and Services Tax
JAMES A. GIESECKE and NHI H. TRAN
Centre of Policy Studies, Victoria University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia
The major political parties support the tenet of the original GST
agreement that GST change requires unanimous state approval.
However, GST change could differentially affect state economies,
and thus influence support from individual states. We investigate the
potential for GST change to differentially affect state economies. We
do this by developing a multi-regional model of the Australian
economy that contains details of the legislated features of the GST.
In this model, when we change any element of the GST, the economic
effects are informed by regional differences in economic structure
and their interactions with the details of our GST theory.
I Introduction
Goods and services tax (GST) reform options
have recently returned to prominence in tax
policy debate, particularly since the release of
the Commonwealth Government’s Tax Discus-
sion Paper (Australian Government 2015). This is
after a long period in which GST reform was off
the political agenda (Freebairn, 2011). Subse-
quent calls to raise the GST rate have been made
by a number of state premiers (Australian Broad-
casting Corporation, 2016) and the Australian
Institute of Company Directors (Proust, 2017).
While there is no constitutional impediment to
the federal government unilaterally changing the
GST, the major political parties support the
principle that GST change needs the unanimous
support of state and territory governments (Boc-
cabella & Bain, 2015). One potential impediment
to securing unanimous support is well known,
namely, concerns among policy-makers in some
states, such as Western Australia, over the way
GST revenue is distributed (Freebairn, 2015).
These concerns relate to the differential impacts
across states of GST revenue distribution under
the horizontal fiscal equalisation (HFE) system.
In this paper, we are concerned with a different,
but related, inter-jurisdictional question: how
does raising a given amount of GST revenue
affect the distribution of economic activity across
Australia’s states and territories? This is impor-
tant, because perceptions that the GST affects
individual states in different ways could frustrate
the achievement of unanimous support for GST
reform. To examine this, we introduce to a multi-
regional model of the Australian economy
detailed modelling of the implemented features
of the GST system. This includes modelling of the
many departures of Australia’s GST from an
‘ideal’ system.1 Broadly, Australia’s GST departs
from an ideal system in five ways: (i) some
commodities are GST-free2 ; (ii) some commodi-
ties are input-taxed, or in terms of the
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1 An ideal GST system (i.e., one imposing the lowest
allocative efficiency and compliance costs) has a single
rate on all domestic sales, reclamation of GST paid on
inputs to production and investment, a zero rate on
exports, and no exemptions. A GST with these
attributes acts like a pure consumption tax (Ebrill
et al., 2001).
2 Examples include: basic foods, educational
courses, health services, health insurance, medical aids,
water services, sewerage and drainage services, and
transport of passengers to and from Australia.
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international value added tax (VAT) terminology,
they are ‘GST exempt’3 ; (iii) GST registration is
optional for low-turnover firms4 ; (iv) some
imports are GST exempt5 ; and (v) some exports
(namely, on-shore sales to non-residents, such as
foreign tourists) are not zero-rated.6 As we
discuss below, while previous economy-wide
VAT modelling exercises have addressed
selected elements of these departures from an
ideal system, to our knowledge, ours is the first
paper to model all these elements, and to do so
within a detailed multi-regional framework. As
we shall see, regional differences in economic
structure are consequential for the measured
effects of GST policy change when we model
the implemented details of the GST system.
The earliest economy-wide modelling of Aus-
tralia’s GST is Dixon and Rimmer (1999). They
used publicly available price results from the
Treasury’s price input-output model to infer the
Treasury’s undisclosed assumptions about net
movements in indirect tax rates implied by the
replacement of wholesale sales tax by the GST.
Hence, Dixon and Rimmer carried assumptions
about implicit changes in indirect tax rates on
production, investment, and exports. This was a
departure from traditional CGE modelling of GST
based on the ideal system. However, Dixon and
Rimmer did not explicitly model details of
Australia’s GST system.
Outside Australia, there have been some efforts
to explicitly model details of actual VAT systems
in computable general equilibrium (CGE) mod-
els, albeit at varying levels of detail. For example,
recognition of different VAT rates and exemp-
tions can be found in studies by Gottfried and
Wiegard (1991), Marks (2005), and Toh and Lin
(2005), although each sector is assumed to be
either fully taxed or fully exempt. Paz (2015)
takes into account VAT on intermediate inputs
and VAT thresholds. de Quatrebarbes et al.
(2016) allow for partial exemptions. Giesecke
and Tran (2010) account for multi-production,
differentiated degrees of exemption by commod-
ity and user, and industry-specific differences in
capacities to reclaim VAT paid on production
inputs. Giesecke and Tran (2012) developed this
system further, including differentiated VAT
registration rates, undeclared imports, unclaimed
tax on tourist spending, and general and transac-
tion-specific compliance rates. Giesecke and Tran
(2012) used their model to examine VAT com-
pliance rates, but outside a wider CGE system.
In this paper, we extend the Giesecke and Tran
(2012) system by adding regional detail. We then
embed the system within a multi-regional CGE
model of Australia. This allows us to examine the
consequences for Australia and its regions of the
full details of the GST system as legislated. To
our knowledge, the only previous general equi-
librium study of VAT at the regional level is Zhai
and He (2008), which modelled VAT in a two-
region, four-sector model with multiple VAT
rates and multiple VAT deduction (i.e. refund)
rates.7
An important methodological contribution of
our paper is that it sets out a GST modelling
framework, suitable for embedding in a large-
scale CGE model, that carries details of VAT
systems as actually implemented by tax author-
ities. A detailed GST framework is important in
CGE analysis of GST issues for three reasons.
First, it allows GST payments to be correctly
3 See Division 40 (Input taxed supplies) of A New
Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 (GST
Act). Subdivisions 40A–40G describe specific input
taxed transactions. The most economically significant
are Subdivisions 40A–40C (financial supplies, residen-
tial rent and residential premises). For such services,
producers charge no GST, and cannot reclaim GST on
inputs. GST on inputs to production of exempt goods
passes into the cost stream for these goods, and is
passed on as higher prices to users of the goods,
irrespective of whether they are consumers, industries
or foreigners. This creates tax cascading, with positive
effective GST rates faced by all producers and foreign-
ers purchasing the exempt goods.
4 GST registration is optional for firms with turnover
of $75,000 or less. Unregistered firms do not charge
GST, and cannot reclaim GST on inputs. This creates an
additional source of input-taxed sales. Because unreg-
istered firms can exist in any industry, sales of all
products have the potential to be input-taxed to some
degree.
5 These include imports falling below the low value
threshold of $1,000, and a number of goods with
import-duty-free status. GST will be imposed on low-
value imports from 1 July 2018 (Australian Taxation
Office, 2017).
6 A refund for GST under the Tourist Refund
Scheme can only be claimed for a small subset of
goods purchased locally by non-residents (Department
of Immigration and Border Protection, 2017), and many
visitors who can reclaim GST do not do so.
7 However, Zhai and He do not discuss how they
model deduction rates, and do not model many other
features of VAT.
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represented in the model’s database, which is
important for accurate calculation of the alloca-
tive efficiency impacts, and thus also the welfare
impacts, of policy change.8 Second, the detailed
GST theory allows effective GST rates to be
influenced by endogenous changes in economic
structure, and changes in legislated GST rates,
exemptions and refund rates.9 This improves
modelling of the relative price consequences of
GST reforms, whether these be changes in rates,
exemptions, registration rates, or other factors.
Finally, and as emphasised in this paper, it
facilitates investigation of the regional conse-
quences of GST reform. Although the GST is a
national tax, as we discuss in Section II, the
operations of the GST are influenced by regional
differences in: shares of taxable and input-taxed
supplies in regional economic activity; the pro-
portion of regional exports explained by sales to
foreign visitors; GST registration rates across
industries; and propensities to import low-value
items.
The remainder of this paper is structured as
follows. Section II describes the model. We begin
with a brief overview of the Victoria University
Regional Model (VURM) in Section II(i). VURM
is the multi-regional CGE model into which we
build our GST equation system. This system is
presented in Section II(ii). Section III presents
the results of a simulation in which we raise the
standard GST rate from 10 per cent to 11 per cent.
Section IV concludes.
II The Model
(i) The Victoria University Regional Model
The starting point for the modelling reported in
this paper is VURM, a dynamic multi-regional
CGE model of the Australian economy.10 The
standard version of VURM does not contain
detailed GST theory. We provide a brief overview
of VURM, before discussing the detailed GST
theory developed for VURM for this paper.
VURM models the behaviour of economic
agents within each of Australia’s states and
territories and identifies a large number of indus-
tries and commodities.11 Neoclassical assump-
tions govern the behaviour of the model’s
economic agents. Each representative industry
operating within each region is assumed to
minimise costs subject to a constant-returns-to-
scale production technology and given input
prices. A representative utility-maximising
household resides in each region. Investors allo-
cate new capital to industries on the basis of
expected rates of return. Units of new capital are
assumed to be cost-minimising combinations of
inputs sourced from each of the model’s sources
of supply (the domestic regions plus imports).
Imperfect substitutability between the imported
and domestic sources of supply for each com-
modity is modelled using the constant elasticity
(CES) assumption of Armington. In general,
markets are assumed to clear and to be compet-
itive. Purchasers’ prices differ from basic prices
by the value of indirect taxes and margin services.
Taxes and margins can differ across commodity,
user, region of source and region of destination.
Foreign demand for each commodity from each
domestic region is modelled as inversely related
to its foreign currency price. The model includes
details of the taxing, spending and transfer
activities of two levels of government: a regional
government operating within each region, and a
federal government operating Australia-wide.
Dynamic equations describe stock–flow relation-
ships, such as those between regional industry
capital stocks and regional industry investment.
Dynamic adjustment equations allow for the
gradual movement of a number of variables
8 For a clear exposition of how the distribution of
indirect taxes influences measured allocative efficiency
effects of policy change, see equation (C.3) in Mariano
and Giesecke (2014). The allocative efficiency effects
of GST change will be miscalculated if GST is
distributed across the wrong bases in the model’s
database. There is evidence of this in the input–output
data supplied by the Australian Bureau of Statistics
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2016a), which show no
GST on intermediate inputs to any industries other than
finance and dwellings. This implies 100 per cent GST
registration rates across all industries and no informal
activity. This effectively narrows the GST base. As a
result, the ABS data contain implied GST rates
exceeding the legislated 10 per cent for a number of
transactions.
9 Without theory describing the full detail of the
GST, modellers must calculate changes in effective tax
rates outside the model. This may not be accurate over
time if there are changes in the division of a sector’s
activity across production of exempt and non-exempt
commodities (see variable SOc,i,s in Equation 7a).
10 VURM’s database is calibrated to reflect ABS
national accounts data and government financial statis-
tics for 2015–16. For a detailed description of VURM,
see Adams et al. (2015).
11 The model contains 76 region-specific industries
producing 78 commodities.
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towards their long-run values. In this regard, we
allow region-specific employment rates to tem-
porarily depart from baseline values under an
assumption of short-run wage stickiness. Over
time, regional wage adjustment gradually returns
region-specific employment rates to baseline.
Similarly, we allow regional per-capita real
disposable income relativities to temporarily
depart from baseline, under an assumption of
short-run stickiness in rates of inter-regional
migration. Over time, gradual adjustment of rates
of inter-regional migration returns inter-regional
per-capita real disposable income relativities
back to baseline.12 Regional economic linkages
arise from inter-regional trade, factor mobility,
the taxing and spending activities of federal and
state governments, and long-run economy-wide
employment and balance-of-trade (BOT) con-
straints. The model evaluates a full set of national
and regional income accounts, and associated
deflators. In solving the model, we undertake two
parallel model runs: a baseline simulation, and a
policy simulation (as discussed in Section IV(i),
we also undertake a number of decomposition
simulations of the policy simulation).13 The
baseline simulation is a business-as-usual fore-
cast for 2017–30. The policy simulation is iden-
tical to the baseline simulation in all respects
other than the addition of the exogenous shocks
describing the policy under investigation. We
report model results as percentage (and in some
cases, monetary) deviations in the values of
variables in each year of the policy simulation
away from their baseline values.14
(ii) The GST Equation System
Building on Giesecke and Tran (2010, 2012),
our GST system models: multiple legislated tax
rates across commodities; different legislated
GST exemption statuses across commodities;
different legislated capacities to reclaim GST on
inputs to production and investment; different
rates of registration for GST purposes; export
taxation via application of GST on domestic
purchases by non-residents; and potential for
incomplete GST collections due to non-compli-
ance. We also require the GST system to carry
sufficient detail to be embedded in a multi-
regional model. Hence, we require the model to
describe details of the legislated GST system as it
relates to all commodities, from all sources, used
by all agents in all regions. The agents comprise
industries, investors, and final users. The regions
comprise the eight states and territories. The
sources comprise the eight domestic regions plus
imports. We expand below.
Tables 1–3 present the GST system we add to
VURM. We now briefly describe this system.15
Equation (1) calculates GST revenue collected
on individual commodity transactions as the
product of an effective tax rate and the relevant
GST transaction base as calculated by Equa-
tion (2). Equation (3a) calculates the effective
GST rate on supplies to domestic users on the
basis of the relevant GST rate, the extent to which
the transaction is GST exempt, and the extent to
which the purchaser can reclaim GST. Equa-
tion (3b) calculates the effective GST rate on
exports as the share-weighted average of the
effective GST rates on onshore sales to foreign
visitors and offshore sales to foreign customers.
Effective rates on offshore sales are 0, because
the legislated rate (LRc,s,export) is 0. Onshore sales
to foreign visitors (such as tourists) attract the
same GST rates as sales to Australian households
(i.e. LRc,s,household ≥ 0). REFEXPc,s provides for
some GST refund for departing tourists. Equa-
tion (4) determines the effective exemption rate
as a function of the legally mandated exemption
rate and what we term the de facto exemption
rate. In calculating the de facto exemption rate we
distinguish between domestically produced com-
modities (via Equation 5a) and imports (via
Equation 5b). Equation (5a) recognises that
GST is not charged on commodities sold by
businesses that are not registered for GST pur-
poses. Hence, the de facto exemption rate
depends on the proportion of activity within each
industry that is undertaken by unregistered firms.
For imported commodities, Equation (5b) sets the
de facto exemption rate equal to the share of
imports that are undeclared for GST purposes.
Equation (6) calculates the share of business
12 See Giesecke and Madden (2013) for a description
of the model’s regional labour market and migration
theory.
13 The model is solved using the GEMPACK mod-
elling software package (Harrison & Pearson, 1996).
14 See Dixon and Rimmer (2002) for a thorough
review of the construction of baseline and policy
simulations.
15 A more detailed discussion of the GST system is in
a supplementary information file available online
or from the authors on request. This file also contains
a discussion of the system’s operations using a number
of transaction examples.
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activity that is registered for GST purposes on the
basis of two possible types of non-registration:
businesses permitted to be unregistered under
GST law, and businesses operating informally.
Equations (7a)–(7d) calculate GST refund rates
by purchaser type. Equation (7a) calculates the
share of GST paid on intermediate inputs that is
refundable. It recognises that the GST Act allows
only registered firms to claim GST refunds, and
only to the extent that the firms are producing
commodities that are not GST exempt. Equa-
tion (7b) recognises that refunds on inputs to
capital creation are the same as those on inputs to
current production by the same industry. Equa-
tions (7c) and (7d) recognise that households
cannot claim GST refunds, while government
can.
III Simulation
(i) Simulation Design
As discussed in Section II, the full VURM
database recognises eight states and territories. In
this paper, for expository purposes we aggregate
VURM’s regions into two: Australia’s most
populous state, New South Wales (NSW), and
the rest of Australia (RoA). Our aim is to explore
the relative regional effects of raising additional
revenue via a higher GST rate. To do so, we raise
the standard rate from 10 per cent to 11 per cent
(i.e. we raise by 0.01 the elements of LRc,s,u in
Equations (3a) and (3b) that have an initial value
of 0.10). We do this under a model closure in
which:
1 Regional labour markets are characterised by
short-run stickiness of the real wage with
endogenous regional unemployment rates,
transitioning to a long-run environment in
which regional real wages are endogenous
and regional unemployment rates return to
baseline. In formulating short-run wage
demands, we assume workers understand they
will be compensated for changes in the GST
via lump sum transfer (see points 4 and 5
below). Hence the real wage measure that is
sticky in the short-run is defined as the
nominal wage deflated by the Consumer Price
Index (CPI) evaluated at prices excluding
GST.16
2 Inter-regional migration rates are sticky in the
short run, but adjust gradually to ensure that
inter-regional relativities in regional per-capita
real disposable income return to baseline.
3 Capital and investment are specific to each
regional industry. Capital stocks are sticky in
the short run, but adjust gradually in response
to changes in investment. Annual investment in
each regional industry is positively related to
the ratio of actual to required rates of return. A
policy shock can cause these ratios to tem-
porarily depart from their baseline values in the
short run, but they are gradually returned to
baseline values via changes in capital stocks.
TABLE 1
Sets of the GST Equation System
Name Set elements Set description
COM (c = 1,. . .,78) All commodities
REG (r = 1,. . .,8) All domestic regions
SRC (s = 1,. . .,8, foreign) Union of the set of domestic sources (REG) and the single foreign
source (foreign)
IND (i = 1,. . .,76) All industries
INV (k = 1,. . .,76) All industry-specific capital creators
GOV {state and local, federal} Two government levels: state and local, and federal
MAR (m = 1,. . .,10) Margin commodities
DOM IND ∪ INV ∪ GOV ∪ {household} All domestic users of commodities
REGU DOM 9 REG All domestic region-specific users of commodities
ALLU REGU ∪ {Export} Union of the set of domestic region-specific users (REGU) and
the single export user
16 This is similar to the Dixon and Rimmer (1999)
central scenario, in which they assume the real after-tax
wage is sticky in the short run.
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4 The federal public sector borrowing require-
ment (PSBR) follows its baseline path, via
endogenous adjustment of a national lump-sum
household tax.
5 State-specific PSBRs are exogenously held on
their baseline paths, via endogenous adjust-
ment of lump-sum taxes on households within
each state.
TABLE 2
The GST Equation System
Equation Range
GSTc;s;u ¼ ERc;s;u  TRBASEc;s;u ð1Þ (c2COM; s2SRC; u2ALLU)
TRBASEc;s;u ¼ VBASc;s;u þ VTAXc;s;u þ
X
m2MAR
VMARc;s;u;m ð2Þ (c2COM; s2SRC; u2ALLU)
ERc;s;u ¼ LRc;s;u  ½1 EEXc;s;u  ½1 REFu  CRc;s;u ð3aÞ (c2COM; s2SRC; u2REGU)
ERc;s;export ¼ CRc;s;export  f½LRc;s;household  SHNRESc;s
 ð1 EEXc;s;householdÞ  ð1 REFEXPc;sÞ
þ ½LRc;s;export
 ð1 SHNRESc;sÞ  ð1 EEXc;s;exportÞg
ð3bÞ
(c2COM; s2REG)
EEXc;s;u ¼ LEXc;s;u þ ð1 LEXc;s;uÞ  DEXc;s;u ð4Þ (c2COM; s2SRC; u2ALLU)
DEXc;s;u ¼ 1
X
i2IND SJc;s;i  REGISTi;s ð5aÞ
(c2COM; s2REG; u2ALLU)
DEXc;foreign;u ¼ ILMc;u ð5bÞ (c2COM; u2REGU)*
REGISTi;s ¼ ð1 NRLi;sÞð1 NRIi;sÞ ð6Þ (i2IND; s2REG)
REFi;s ¼ REGISTi;s 
X
c2COM
SOc;i;s
X
u2ALL
X
r2REG
SSc;s;u;r½1 LEXc;s;u;r ð7aÞ (i2IND; s2REG)
REFk;r ¼
X
i2IND
dk;iREFi;r ð7bÞ (k2INV; r2REG)
REFHouseholds;r ¼ 0 ð7cÞ (r2REG)
REFg;r ¼ 1 ð7dÞ (g2GOV; r2REG)
Note: *There is no re-exporting of imports in our model.
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6 The federal government allocates the addi-
tional GST revenue to state governments on the
basis of population shares.17
7 The ratio of the BOT to gross domestic product
(GDP) is exogenously held on its baseline path
via movements in the economy-wide average
propensity to consume.
8 Subject to the movements in the economy-wide
average propensity to consume given by point
6 above, region-specific household consump-
tion spending is determined as a fixed propor-
tion of region-specific household disposable
income.
9 Values for real public consumption spending
by federal and state governments are exoge-
nously held on their baseline paths over the
simulation period.
As described by points 1–9, it is clear the
simulation involves a number of endogenous
policy adjustments (e.g. changes in grants and
transfers) in addition to the GST rate rise. To
distinguish the effects of the rate rise from the
effects of the parallel policy adjustments, we
undertake a decomposition simulation. The
decomposition simulation divides the total
impact of the GST rate rise into six compo-
nents, namely the effects of: (1) raising the
GST rate; (2) returning GST to each state on a
collections basis (i.e., each state receives the
GST collected within its borders); (3) an
adjustment to this hypothetical collections-basis
distribution to reflect the true equal per-capita
basis for distributing GST revenue in excess of
HFE needs; (4) the adjustments to state gov-
ernment transfers to households required to
keep state government PSBRs on baseline; (5)
the adjustment of federal grants to households
required to hold the federal PSBR on baseline;
and (6) the adjustment of the economy-wide
household savings rate required to ensure the
ratio of the BOT to GDP remains on baseline.
These effects are labelled ‘Decomp 1–6’ respec-
tively in the decomposition figures.18
(ii) Results
A back-of-the-envelope model
Figure 1 reports the full simulation results for
the deviations in national employment, capital,
real GDP, and the real wage. Figure 2 decom-
poses the GDP deviation into the individual
contributions of the six factors discussed in
Section IV(i). This figure shows that, of the six
factors, it is the GST rate rise that is the dominant
influence on the macroeconomy. Hence, we begin
our discussion with this factor. We follow Dixon
and Rimmer (1999) in their use of a back-of-the-
envelope (BOTE) model to guide our macro
results discussion. We reproduce key elements
of their BOTE model below.
Assume the economy produces one good and
imports one good. Production of the domestic
good is a Cobb–Douglas (CD) function of labour
(L) and capital (K). Units of consumption and
investment are produced via CD functions of
inputs of the domestic good and the foreign
good.19 Under zero pure profit and cost-minimis-
ing assumptions in the production and distribu-
tion of the domestic good, the consumption good,
and the investment good, we have:
PC ¼ Pa
C
D
D  Pa
C
M
M  TC ð8Þ
MPKðK=LÞ ¼ TD  ðQ=PDÞ ð9Þ
PI ¼ Pa
I
D
D  Pa
I
M
M  TI ð10Þ
q ¼ Q=PI ð11Þ
MPLðK=LÞ ¼ TD  ðW=PDÞ ð12Þ
WR ¼ W  TC=PC ð13Þ
where PD and PM are the basic price of the
domestic good and the c.i.f. price of the imported
good; PC and PI are the purchaser price of a unit
of consumption and investment; TC, TI, and TD
are the powers (1 plus the rates) of tax on
consumption, investment and production; WR is
the nominal wage deflated by the GST-exclusive
consumption deflator; Q is the rental price of17 As outlined in Productivity Commission (2017,
p. 7), GST revenue remaining after applying Common-
wealth Grants Commission (CGC) HFE formulae is
distributed on an equal per-capita basis.
18 A detailed discussion of the decomposition simu-
lation is contained in the online supplementary infor-
mation.
19 VURM’s production theory is based on nested
constant-returns-to-scale Leontief and CES production
functions. In constructing the BOTE model, CD is an
effective simplification of this structure.
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capital; q is the rate of return on capital; aCD and
aCM are the cost shares of domestic and imported
goods in a unit of consumption (with
aCD þ aCM ¼ 1); and aID and aIM are the cost shares
of domestic and imported goods in a unit of
investment (with aID þ aIM ¼ 1). Equations (8) and
(10) are CD unit cost functions. Equations (9) and
(12) describe optimising demands for L and K.
Equation (11) defines the rate of return. Equa-
tion (13) defines the real wage. Via Equa-
tions (8)–(13) we have:
MPLðK=LÞ ¼ TD WR  ðPM=PDÞa
C
M ð14Þ
MPKðK=LÞ ¼ q  TD  TI  ðPM=PDÞa
I
M ð15Þ
When we raise the GST in VURM to 11 per
cent, this can be viewed in the BOTE model as
increases in TC, TD and TI. The explanation for
the rise in TC is straightforward: in Equation (3a),
for the household, values for EEX tend to be low,
REF is 0, and values for CR are close to 1. Hence,
the rise in LR translates strongly into a rise in the
effective rate of tax on consumption. This is clear
in Figure 3, which reports the deviation in the
ratio of: (i) the national consumption deflator as
normally defined; and (ii) a measure of the
consumption deflator that excludes the GST.
The rise in TD arises from non-unitary values for
REFu,r. In a theoretically ideal system, REFu,
r = 1, for all u 2 IND, ∀ r 2 REG. But
Equation (7a) reminds us that producers can only
reclaim GST paid on inputs to the extent that they
produce goods that are not GST exempt, and
register for GST. The exempt status of banking,
finance and some insurance render producers of
these commodities input-taxed. We represent this
by low REFi,s values for industries producing
these commodities. We account for industry-
specific non-registration rates by informing values
for NRIi,r and NRLi,r with ABS data on business
counts and informal activity (Australian Bureau of
Statistics, 2013, 2015). Values for NRLi,r are low,
and often 0, with an average value around 0.005.
Values for NRIi,r are also low (around 0.004 on
average).20 Hence, in terms of Equation (7a),
typical values for REGIST are a little below 1,
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20 NRI values range from 0 for sectors dominated by
large regulated enterprises, to around 2 per cent for a
handful of sectors where ABS data suggest higher
informality rates (e.g. construction, construction ser-
vices and accommodation services).
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thus values for REFi,s are less than 1 for many
industries. Via Equation (3a), this introduces low
levels of input taxation to many industries. Via
these two routes, production of exempt commodi-
ties and non-registration, an increase in the GST
has the effect of raising taxes on production. In the
BOTE model, this is represented by a rise in TD. In
the VURM simulation, this is apparent in the
positive deviation in the ratio of (i) an intermedi-
ate input cost index at purchasers’ prices as
normally defined, and (ii) an intermediate input
cost index excluding GST but otherwise at pur-
chasers’ prices (Figure 3).
A number of elements of the GST result in
investment taxation (a rise in TI in BOTE). Under
a pure GST system REFu,r = 1 for all u 2 INV, for
all r 2 REG. But as already discussed, firms
cannot reclaim GST on inputs to the extent that
they produce exempt goods or are unregistered.
Equations (7a), (7b) and (3a) introduce low levels
of investment taxation to many industries via non-
registration, and high levels of investment taxa-
tion for banking, finance, insurance and dwellings
via the exempt status of many of the products
these sectors produce. For the macro-economy,
this is reflected in the positive deviation in the
ratio of (i) the investment price deflator as
normally defined, and (ii) the investment price
deflator excluding GST (Figure 3).
National results
We use Equations (14) and (15) to explain the
short-run and long-run results in Figure 1. In the
short run, with the real wage (WR) and the capital
stock (K) sticky, the rise in production taxes (TD)
causes the marginal product of labour (MPL) to
rise.21 With K sticky, this requires L to fall. This
accounts for the short-run negative deviation in
employment, which in turn, accounts for the short
run negative deviation in real GDP (Figure 1).
FIGURE 1
National Employment, Capital Stock, Real GDP, and Wage Deflated by GST-Exclusive Consumption Deflator,
WR (% Deviation from Baseline)
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21 In Equations (14) and (15), the ratio PM/PD is a
function of the terms of trade. Movements in this ratio
can be understood as second round outcomes arising
from the first round impacts on K and L of movements
in TC, TD and TI. For this reason, together with our
assumption in VURM that foreign currency import
prices are exogenous and export demands are highly
elastic, it is appropriate to treat PM/PD as given in our
BOTE explanation.
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Turning to Equation (15), the short-run negative
deviation in L causes a short-run negative devia-
tion in the marginal product of capital (MPK).
Ceteris paribus, this causes the rate of return on
capital (q) to fall relative to baseline. The down-
ward pressure on q via the negative deviation in
MPK is reinforced by the rise in indirect taxation of
investment and production (TI and TD). This
accounts for the sharp negative deviation in real
investment in the short-run (Figure 4).
As discussed in Section IV(i), VURM’s capital
and labour markets transition in the long run to an
environment in which capital adjustment returns
values for actual rates of return to required rates
of return, and real wage adjustment returns
regional unemployment rates to baseline values.
In Equations (14) and (15), these long-run out-
comes can be described by the exogenous status
of L and q and the endogenous status of WR and
K. In Equation (15), with L and q exogenous, the
rise in taxation of investment and production (TI
and TD) causes the required MPK to rise. With L
given in the long-run, the rise in MPK requires K
to fall. This accounts for the long-run negative
deviation in capital reported in Figure 1. With the
long-run capital stock below baseline, and
employment returning to baseline, real GDP must
be below baseline in the long run (Figure 1).
Turning to Equation (14), with K below base-
line in the long run, and L returning to baseline,
the long run MPL deviation must be negative.
Ceteris paribus, this dampens the deviation in the
long run real wage (WR). This pressure for
negative deviation in WR arising from the long
run negative K deviation is reinforced by the rise
in taxation of intermediate input use.
Figure 4 reports deviations in the expenditure
side components of real GDP. As discussed with
reference to Equation (15), rates of return on
capital fall in the short run. This explains the
short-run negative investment deviation. Invest-
ment is relatively import intensive. Also, the rise
in the GST on export tourism depresses trade
relative to GDP. Both factors account for the
negative import volume deviation in the simula-
tion’s first year. With the BOT to GDP ratio
FIGURE 2
National Real GDP Deviation: Decomposition into Contributing Factors (% Deviation from Baseline)
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exogenous, the negative import deviation requires
a simultaneous negative export deviation. The
negative export deviation causes a positive devi-
ation in the terms of trade.22 The positive
deviation in the terms of trade lifts national
income relative to GDP. This explains why the
real private consumption deviation lies above the
real GDP deviation.
In the long run, as discussed with reference to
Equation (15), capital adjustment gradually
returns rates of return towards baseline. This
accounts for the gradual attenuation of the neg-
ative investment deviation in Figure 4. Neverthe-
less, the long-run investment deviation remains
negative, because the long-run capital deviation
is negative (Figure 1). Investment is relatively
import intensive, hence the long-run attenuation
of the negative investment deviation causes a
long-run attenuation of the negative import
deviation. Via the closure assumption that the
BOT to GDP ratio remains on baseline, the long-
run negative deviation in imports requires that
there be a long-run negative deviation in exports.
The negative export deviation lies below the
negative import deviation because the terms-of-
trade deviation is positive, and the baseline level
of the BOT is in deficit. Despite the long-run
convergence of the investment and GDP devia-
tions, the import deviation remains below the
GDP deviation in the long run. This reflects
taxation of export tourism, which damps trade
relative to GDP. The long-run negative export
deviation causes a small positive terms-of-trade
deviation. However, the attenuation in the export
deviation over the medium to long run causes the
terms-of-trade deviation to attenuate over the
longer run. This accounts for the attenuation of
the gap between the deviations in private con-
sumption and GDP. This effect is reinforced by
the fixity of public consumption at baseline,
which leaves private consumption alone to adjust
to movements in national income.
FIGURE 3
Ratios of Four Deflators with and without GST (Private Consumption, Intermediate Input Costs, Investment, and
Exports). In Each Case: Ratio of the Deflator as Normally Defined (i.e. Inclusive of GST) to the Deflator Excluding
GST (but Otherwise as Normally Defined) (% Deviation from Baseline)
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Note(s): ‘c’ stands for ‘including’, as opposed to ‘ex.’ for ‘excluding’.
22 In VURM, commodity-specific export volumes are
negatively related to commodity-specific export prices.
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Industry results
For reporting, we aggregate the results for
production volumes for VURM’s 76 industries to
outcomes for 17 broad sectors. Figures 5–7 report
output deviations for the top six, middle five, and
bottom six industries as ranked by 2030 outcomes.
Health and education are the two top-ranked
sectors in the long-run (Figure 5). Sales to public
consumption represent high shares of the output
of both sectors. As discussed in Section IV(i), we
assume that public consumption remains on base-
line. This supports the output of health and
education. It also accounts for the presence of
public administration and defence among the top-
ranked sectors in Figure 5. A second factor
supporting health and education output is their
GST status. Outputs of both sectors are zero-rated.
Hence, when the GST rate is raised, the relative
consumer price of zero rated education and health
is lowered, inducing substitution towards these
commodities. Similarly, the presence of utilities
among the top-ranked sectors is due to the zero
rating of water and drainage. The remaining two
sectors in Figure 5 are mining and agriculture. As
discussed earlier, the GST rise affects export
tourism. For any given level of aggregate exports,
taxation of export tourism crowds out tourism
exports and crowds in traditional zero-rated
exports such as mining and agriculture. The
output deviations of mining and agriculture are
also constrained by the fixity of natural resource
endowments in both sectors.
Figure 6 reports output deviations for the five
middle-ranked sectors. These sectors subsume
industries that: (i) do not have concentrated sales
to any one final demand category (finance and
insurance, manufacturing, other services); (ii) are
important as intermediate inputs (manufacturing,
other business services); and (iii) are important as
margin services across many sectors and final
demand categories (wholesale trade). In this
simulation, these attributes make the output of
these sectors correlated with a summary measure
of aggregate activity, like GDP. This renders
them middle-ranked when their output results are
compared with the GDP result.
Figure 7 reports output deviations for the six
bottom-ranked sectors. The two sectors with the
FIGURE 4
The Expenditure-Side Components of Real GDP (% Deviation from Baseline)
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largest negative deviations (accommodation and
food, and transport) are important providers of
services to foreign tourists. When making on-shore
purchases of commodities such as hotel stays and
restaurant meals, tourists pay GST and cannot
claim a refund on departure. In VURM, export
demands are modelled as particularly price sensi-
tive. Hence the effective export taxation of
tourism-related sales generates comparatively
large output contraction for sectors such as accom-
modation and transport. This is also a factor in the
negative output deviations for retail trade and
communications.23 The construction services sec-
tor is a key input to investment. Hence, its output
deviation is correlated with the deviation in
aggregate investment. This accounts for the path
of the construction output deviation, which exhi-
bits a sharp negative deviation in the short run,
followed by gradual attenuation in the long run.
The deviation in dwellings output is small in the
short run, consistent with the capital intensity of
this sector. Over the medium to long run, the
dwellings output deviation is negative and lies
slightly below the GDP deviation. This reflects the
relatively high expenditure elasticity for dwell-
ings. With the long-run consumption deviation
being approximately the same as the long-run GDP
deviation (Figure 4), the relatively high household
expenditure elasticity for dwellings services
causes the dwellings output deviation to lie below
the GDP deviation.
Regional results
Figure 8 reports GDP deviations for NSW, RoA
and Australia as a whole. Relative to Australia as
a whole, NSW is adversely affected by the rate
rise. To understand why, we begin by examining
purchasers’ prices in NSW relative to the rest of
the country. Figure 9 reports the deviations in
2030 of the ratios of certain national and regional
FIGURE 5
Sectoral Output Deviations, Top Six Ranked by 2030 Deviation (% Deviation from Baseline)
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23 Both sectors also have some exposure to export
tourism. Retail margins facilitate tourism-related sales
of food, beverages, and other items that are subject to
GST because the purchases are made on-shore. About 8
per cent of communications are exported, and of these,
about 2.4 per cent are onshore sales to non-residents,
and thus subject to GST. Further details on how we
calculate onshore non-resident sales shares are avail-
able in the supplementary information.
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deflators (private consumption, investment,
exports and intermediate input costs) calculated
with and without GST.24 The results for NSW,
RoA and Australian outcomes for the ratio of the
CPI as normally defined (i.e. inclusive of GST) to
a measure of the CPI excluding GST are similar.
This suggests that differences between NSW and
RoA in the GST load on consumption are not an
important factor in explaining the difference
between the NSW and RoA outcomes for real
GDP.
This is not the case for the remaining deflators,
which show sizeable differences between NSW
and RoA in the direct effect of GST on prices for
investment, intermediate inputs and exports. The
gap between the NSW and RoA outcomes for the
direct contribution of the GST to the investment
deflator deviations is approximately 0.1
percentage points. We can trace this to the higher
proportion of activity in NSW in input-taxed
industries, in particular banking, finance, insur-
ance and dwellings. Approximately 4.3 per cent of
NSW investment is in banking, finance and insur-
ance, while the corresponding number for the RoA
is 2.7 per cent. This reflects the status of NSW as a
financial centre. Approximately 30.7 per cent of
NSW investment is in dwellings construction,
while the corresponding number for the RoA is
22 per cent. Much of banking, finance, insurance
and dwellings is GST exempt, rendering the
industries producing these commodities input-
taxed. Because NSW has a higher share of its
investment activity in industries producing GST-
exempt commodities, when we raise the GST, this
has a larger direct effect on the investment price
deflator in NSW relative to the RoA.
Production of GST-exempt goods also con-
tributes to the gap between NSW and RoA
outcomes for the contribution of the GST to
intermediate input costs. GST on intermediate
inputs to insurance, banking and finance explains
about half the gap between the NSW and RoA
FIGURE 6
Sectoral Output Deviations, Middle Five Ranked by 2030 Deviation (% Deviation from Baseline)
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24 Like results for their national counterparts
reported in Figure 3, the deviations in the regional
deflator ratios are steady throughout the simulation
period. Hence no information is lost by reporting only
2030 results.
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results reported in Figure 9. The remainder is due
to GST on intermediate inputs to current produc-
tion of dwelling services. Insurance, banking and
finance are themselves important intermediate
inputs in current production, and the input-
taxation of production of these commodities leads
to some indirect tax cascading. This is more
important in NSW than RoA, where inputs of
banking, finance and insurance are a higher share
of production costs (5.8 per cent versus 4.5 per
cent).
The direct effect of the GST on regional
export prices accounts for 0.1 percentage points
of the gap between the export price deviations
for NSW and RoA (Figure 9). We trace this to
the greater importance of export tourism to
NSW relative to RoA. A rise in the GST
translates to a rise in export taxation to the
extent that it falls upon commodities purchased
on-shore by non-residents, and to the extent that
such GST collections are not refunded on
departure. Relative to RoA, the VURM database
shows a heavier weighting of NSW exports
towards commodities with these characteristics.
We conclude with a discussion of fiscal
impacts, a final source of additional damage to
the NSW economy relative to that experienced by
RoA. Figure 10 reports PSBR outcomes for
NSW, decomposed into the individual contribu-
tions of our six factors. For the purposes of our
decomposition analysis, we divide the federal
return of GST revenue to the states into two
components: (i) an allocation equal to the amount
of GST collected within the state; and (ii) a
correction sufficient to bring the net grant in line
with CGC allocations of additional revenue on a
per-capita basis. Consistent with our assumption
of no change in state PSBRs relative to baseline,
in Figure 10 the net impact of the six decompo-
sition factors on the NSW PSBR deviation is zero
throughout the simulation. There are two sources
of positive contribution to the NSW PSBR
deviation: federal GST grants calculated on a
collection basis, and the effects of the GST rate
FIGURE 7
Sectoral Output Deviations, Bottom Six Ranked by 2030 Deviation (% Deviation from Baseline)
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rise itself.25 Two factors return the NSW PSBR
position to zero deviation: (i) a correction to the
collection-basis allocation of GST revenue, suf-
ficient to bring the net grant of additional GST
revenue in line with that determined by popula-
tion shares; and (ii) state government transfers to
households. For NSW, the population share
correction to the collection basis for grant allo-
cation is negative (Figure 10). It is positive by the
same dollar amount for RoA.26 The grant correc-
tion thus reduces the grant allocation relative to
the amount of GST collected from NSW, while
for RoA the reverse is the case, with RoA
receiving more in GST grants than GST collected
within the region. Figure 8 reports the effects on
NSW and RoA real Gross State Product (GSP) of
the grant correction in isolation from all other
shocks, under an assumption that state govern-
ments pass on the grant corrections to households
via lump-sum taxes/transfers.27
Figure 8 makes clear that, relative to a collec-
tions basis for distributing additional GST rev-
enue, the CGC per capita correction damps the
FIGURE 8
Real National GDP and Regional GSP at Market Prices, and Comparison of Total GSP Impacts with CGC per-capita
Correction GSP Impacts Only (% Deviation from Baseline)
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25 Taken on its own, the GST rise generates two
sources of positive contribution to the NSW net lending
outcome. First, the negative deviation in NSW activity
lowers NSW investment. In VURM, this affects both
private and public investment. The negative deviation
in NSW public investment reduces net acquisitions of
non-financial assets by the NSW government, moving
the NSW PSBR towards surplus. Second, we hold real
NSW public consumption on baseline throughout the
simulation. However, the unit cost of public expendi-
ture falls relative to baseline, due to the fall in wages
(Figure 1). Both factors move the NSW PSBR towards
surplus.
26 To conserve space, we do not report the RoA fiscal
outcomes.
27 This decomposition is conducted under a closure
slightly different than that for the decompositions
reported in Figure 10 so as to isolate the GSP impacts
of the GST grant correction. Closure details can be
found in Section III of the online supplementary
material.
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NSW GSP deviation relative to that for RoA. The
contribution made by the grant correction to the
difference between NSW and RoA GSP outcomes
grows over time because the correction affects
GSP largely via inter-regional migration. In the
short run, inter-regional migration is sticky. But
over time it gradually adjusts to the differential in
inter-regional post-tax incomes created by the
grant correction. By the simulation’s final year,
the gap between the full simulation outcomes for
NSW and RoA GSP deviations is 0.055
(=0.081 to 0.026) per cent. The gap between
the GSP deviations attributable to the CGC
correction shock alone is 0.041 (=0.029 to
0.012) per cent. Hence, relative to a situation in
which the additional GST revenue is returned to
the states on the basis of GST collections by state,
the per capita adjustment explains about three
quarters (0.041/0.055) of the gap between the
NSW and RoA real GSP deviations in the
simulation’s final year.
IV Concluding Remarks
Debate over GST reform possibilities has
grown in recent years. However, a difficulty for
GST change is that, under current conventions
governing the GST, unanimous state and territory
agreement is required. The support that policy-
makers in a given jurisdiction might lend to a
given GST proposal will be influenced by per-
ceptions of how the proposal affects their juris-
diction. As such, to inform GST policy
deliberations, insights into the regional conse-
quences of GST change are important. The
generation of such insights requires a model in
which: (i) individual states and territories are
modelled in a ‘bottom-up’ way (i.e. as separate
economies in their own right); and (ii) legislated
details of the GST are modelled in full. Our
model, VURM, is bottom-up multi-regional,
explicitly modelling the details of economic
activity within each region. An innovation of
the paper is the integration of a detailed GST
FIGURE 9
Ratios of Selected Macro Deflators Inclusive of GST and Exclusive of GST, Australia,
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model within a regional CGE model. The GST
model describes the legislated complexity of the
GST as it relates to differentiated tax rates, legal
exemptions, refund rates, registration rates,
export taxation and the low-value import thresh-
old. We implement a two-region (NSW and RoA)
version of VURM. When we raise the GST rate
and distribute the new revenue to regional gov-
ernments, our model quantifies a well-known
dimension of the regional economic effects of
the GST: under current CGC arrangements, a
donor state (like NSW) is, relative to other states,
adversely affected by a GST rate rise. However,
our regional model with GST detail identifies
other factors that affect the size of the NSW
economy. In particular, we identify the relative
importance to NSW of input-taxed activities
(such as banking) and export tourism as factors
that cause a rise in the GST rate to damp
economic activity in NSW relative to the RoA.
Hence, a small straightforward change in the GST
rate has consequences for the distribution of
economic activity across Australia’s states and
territories. More complex changes, involving
broadening the base, are also likely to have
differing impacts across states and territories.
Under the current requirement for unanimous
support for GST change, consideration of such
impacts will need to inform inter-governmental
deliberations on GST reform proposals.
We anticipate a number of avenues via which
future work with our model can inform GST
policy analysis. First, for expository purposes,
our paper has focused on economic consequences
for Australia’s largest state, New South Wales,
and the rest of Australia. In future work, we plan
to analyse results using the fully disaggregated
VURM model with eight states and territories.
Second, we plan to investigate a range of base-
broadening reform options. We expect this anal-
ysis to reveal further insights into how the
legislated details of the GST, together with
features of region-specific economic activity,
interact to generate regionally differentiated
impacts from various GST reform options. Third,
the analysis can be extended to investigate the
economic consequences of the state and territory
compensation packages that might be required to
achieve unanimous support for GST reform. An
interesting policy question, which can be quanti-
fied with our GST-augmented VURM model, is
the degree to which the efficiency losses
FIGURE 10
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generated by such compensation packages offset
the efficiency gains that might otherwise be
generated by various tax mix change policy
proposals in which GST reform figures promi-
nently. Finally, we note that, while our model is
implemented for Australia, it is sufficiently flex-
ible to be generalisable to any country with a
fiscal federal system. This would include India,
which has recently introduced a nation-wide GST
system in the presence of multiple state-specific
indirect tax systems, and the USA, where there
are periodic calls for a federal VAT.
Supporting Information
Additional Supporting Information may be
found in the online version of this article:
Appendix S1 Online Supplementary Informa-
tion
REFERENCES
Adams, P., Dixon, J. and Horridge, M. (2015), ‘The
Victoria Regional Model (VURM): Technical Doc-
umentation, 1.0’, CoPS Working Paper No. G-254,
Centre of Policy Studies, Victoria University, Mel-
bourne.
Australian Broadcasting Corporation (2016), ‘GST
debate: Premiers Mike Baird and Jay Weatherill
Say It’s Now up to the Commonwealth’, 7.30 Report.
ABC. Available from: http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/
gst-debate:-premiers-mike-baird-and-jay-weatherill/
7131574.
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2013), ‘Information
Paper: The Non-Observed Economy and Australia’s
GDP, 2012’, Cat. No. 5204.0.55.008. ABS, Canberra.
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2015), ‘Counts of
Australian Businesses, Including Entries and Exits,
Jun 2010 to Jun 2014’, Cat. No. 8165.0. ABS,
Canberra.
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2016a), ‘Australian National
Accounts: Input-Output Tables (Product Details), 2013-
14’, Cat. No. 5215.0.55.001. ABS, Canberra.
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2016b), ‘Australian
National Accounts: Tourism Satellite Account, 2015-
2016’, Cat. No. 5249.0. ABS, Canberra.
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2016c), ‘Australian
National Accounts: Input-Output Tables, 2013-14’,
Cat. No. 5209.0.55.001. ABS, Canberra.
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2017), ‘Australian
National Accounts: National Income, Expenditure
and Product, December 2016’, Cat. No.5206.0. ABS,
Canberra.
Australian Government (2015), Re:think – Tax
Discussion Paper. Commonwealth of Australia,
Canberra.
Australian Legal Information Institute (2000), ‘A New
Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999’,
Commonwealth Consolidated Acts.
Australian Taxation Office (2016a), ‘GST’. Available
from: https://www.ato.gov.au/Business/GST/.
Australian Taxation Office (2016b), ‘Selected GST,
WET and LCT items, 2001-02 to 2014-15 Financial
Years’. Available from: https://data.gov.au/dataset/ta
xation-statistics-2013-14/resource/5f19e6ea-5b8d-
4fff-8e36-a9c0316acf50.
Australian Taxation Office (2017), ‘GST on Low Value
Imported Goods’. Available from: https://www.a
to.gov.au/ Business/International-tax-for-business/
GST-on-low-value-imported-goods/.
Boccabella, D. and Bain, K. (2015), ‘Why the Com-
monwealth Can Change the GST without the States’,
The Conversation, 28 January.
Department of Immigration and Border Protection
(2017), ‘Tourist Refund Scheme’. Available from:
https://www.border.gov.au/Trav/Ente/Tour/Are-you-
a-traveller.
Dixon, P.B. and Rimmer, M.T. (1999), ‘Changes in
Indirect Taxes in Australia: A Dynamic General
Equilibrium Analysis’, Australian Economic Review,
22 (4), 327–48.
Dixon, P.B. and Rimmer, M.T. (2002), Dynamic Gen-
eral Equilibrium Modelling for Forecasting and
Policy. North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Ebrill, L.P., Keen, M., Bodin, J.-P. and Summers, V.
(2001), The Modern VAT. International Monetary
Fund, Washington, DC.
Freebairn, J. (2011), ‘A Better and Larger GST?’,
Economic and Labour Relations Review, 22 (3), 85–
100.
Freebairn, J. (2015), ‘Explainer: COAG and the “GST
Carve-Up”’, The Conversation, 17 April. Available
from: http://theconversation.com/explainer-coag-
and-the-gst-carve-up-40323.
Giesecke, J.A. and Madden, J.R. (2013), ‘Regional
Computable General Equilibrium Modeling’, in
Dixon, P.B., Jorgenson, D. (eds), Handbook of
Computable General Equilibrium Modeling. North-
Holland, Amsterdam.
Giesecke, J.A. and Tran, N.H. (2010), ‘Modelling
Value-Added Tax in the Presence of Multi-produc-
tion and Differentiated Exemptions’, Journal of
Asian Economics, 21 (2), 156–73.
Giesecke, J.A. and Tran, N.H. (2012), ‘A General
Framework for Measuring VAT Compliance Rates’,
Applied Economics, 44 (15), 1867–89.
Gottfried, P. and Wiegard, W. (1991), ‘Exemption
versus Zero Rating: A Hidden Problem of VAT’,
Journal of Public Economics, 46, 307–28.
Harrison, W.J. and Pearson, K.R. (1996), ‘Computing Solu-
tions for Large General Equilibrium Models Using
GEMPACK’, Computational Economics, 9, 83–127.
Mariano, M.J. and Giesecke, J.A. (2014), ‘The Macroe-
conomic and Food Security Implications of Price
© 2018 The Authors. Economic Record published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd on behalf of
Economic Society of Australia
274 ECONOMIC RECORD SEPTEMBER
Interventions in the Philippine Rice Market’, Eco-
nomic Modelling, 37, 350–61.
Marks, S.V. (2005), ‘Proposed Changes to the Value
Added Tax: Implications for Tax Revenue and Price
Distortions’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Stud-
ies, 41 (1), 81–95.
Paz, L.S. (2015), ‘The Welfare Impacts of a Revenue-
Neutral Switch from Tariffs to VAT with Interme-
diate Inputs and a VAT Threshold’, Journal of
International Trade and Economic Development,
24 (4), 465–98.
Productivity Commission (2011), ‘Economic Structure
and Performance of the Australian Retail Industry’,
Productivity Commission Inquiry Report No. 56, 4
November.
Productivity Commission (2017), ‘Horizontal Fiscal Equal-
isation’, Productivity Commission Draft Report.
Proust, E. (2017), ‘Premier’s Regret a Warning for
Turnbull’. Available from: http://aicd.companyd
irectors.com.au/media/media-coverage/premiers-re
gret-a-warning-for-turnbull.
de Quatrebarbes, C., Boccanfuso, D. and Savard, L.
(2016), ‘Beyond Representative Households: The
Macro-Micro Impact Analysis of VAT Designs
Applied to Niger’, Economic Modelling, 57, 76–92.
Toh, M.H. and Lin, Q. (2005), ‘An Evaluation of the
1994 Tax Reform in China Using a General Equilib-
rium model’, China Economic Review, 16, 246–70.
Tourism Research Australia (2017), ‘International
Visitor Survey Results’. Available from: https://
www.tra.gov.au/Research/International-visitors-to-
Australia/international-visitor-survey-results.
Zhai, F. and He, J. (2008), ‘Supply-Side Economics in
the People’s Republic of China’s Regional Context:
A Quantitative Investigation of Its VAT Reform’,
Asian Economic Papers, 7(2), 96–121.
© 2018 The Authors. Economic Record published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd on behalf of
Economic Society of Australia
2018 MODELLING THE GST IN A MULTI-REGIONAL FRAMEWORK 275
